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Rideau v. Whitley: Lack of Evidence or Lack of
Understanding?
INTRODUCTION

Often referred to as the "Great Writ," the writ of habeas corpus,
is the exclusive federal remedy available to a state prisoner who
challenges the fact or duration of his or her conviction and seeks
release. The prisoner files a petition for writ of habeas corpus in a
United States District Court. The petition alleges not guilt or
innocence but only that the prisoner is held in violation of his or her
constitutional rights. In response, the warden asserts the prisoner is
lawfully detained on the basis of a criminal conviction. At that point
the district court is in the position to review the petitioner's claim and
determine whether his or her detention is in violation of federal law.
As a way of taming the Great Writ, Congress enacted Rule 9(a).
Emphasizing the significant interplay between the writ of habeas
corpus and Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 cases,' the
Fifth Circuit declared: "because Rule 9(a) authorizes the summary
disposition of habeas corpus petitions on grounds unrelated to the
constitutional claims, its application necessarily must be limited to
avoid the abrogation of the very purpose of the writ."2
In 1976, Congress enacted Rule 9(a) to minimize abuse ofthe writ
of habeas corpus by limiting the petitioner's right to assert stale
claims. Under Rule 9(a) a petition attacking the judgment of a state
court may be dismissed on grounds of delay if the State has been
prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition. The equitable
nature of the rule allows for petition at any time if the prisoner can
prove the petition is based on grounds of which he or she could not
have had knowledge in the ordinary exercise of diligence under the
law.
In Rideau v. Whitley,3 petitioner Wilbert Rideau, claimed the
selection of the Louisiana grand jury that indicted him for murder
made him the victim ofracial discrimination in violation ofthe Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Fifth Circuit,
in an opinion written by Judge James Dennis, held: (1) the State
failed to make a sufficient showing of prejudice in its ability to
respond to the petition caused by the petitioner's delay, pursuant to
Rule 9(a) ofthe Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases of Title 28; and
(2) the petitioner established a prima facie case of equal protection

1.
Federal
2.
3.

Copyright 2003, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Rules such as 9(a), 28 U.S.C. following section 2254, supplement the
Rules of Civil Procedure for habeas cases.
McDonnell v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 246, 251 (5th Cir. 1982).
237 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2000).
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violation resulting from a racially discriminatory grand jury selection,
which the State failed to rebut.4
Although several issues were addressed in Rideau, this note
discusses the part ofthe court's holding regarding dismissal ofhabeas
corpus claims when the State alleges prejudice in its ability to respond.
The holding ofRideau was correct; the State did not meet its burden of
proving particularized prejudice as a result of Rideau's delayed
petition. While endorsing the court's decision, this note provides
guidance for practitioners and clarifies the Fifth Circuit's standard for
a particularized showing ofprejudice. The standard is not unattainable;
it is however, easily misunderstood. In Rideau the State failed to meet
its burden ofproof, perhaps not for lack of evidence, but because the
State misapplied the standard ofparticularized prejudice required by the
court.
This note is organized into four parts. Part I discusses back-ground
information, legislative history and public policies relating to Rule 9(a).
Part HI summarizes the Rideau case, including pertinent procedural
history. Part III provides the holding and reasoning of the court; it is
subdivided into three sections, each addressing the separate elements
of the State's burden ofproof. Finally, Part IV analyzes how the State
in Rideau could successfully have met its burden of proof pursuant to
Rule 9(a).
I. BACKGROUND

Rule 9(a) ofthe Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases was enacted
by Congress in 1976. Codifying the equitable doctrine oflaches,5 Rule
9(a) requires the courts to conduct an inquiry into the reasonableness
of the petitioner's delay, and whether such delay results in prejudice to
the State's ability to respond.6 Rule 9(a) of the Rules Governing
Section 2254 Cases provides:
A petition may be dismissed ifit appears that the state ofwhich
the respondent is an officer has been prejudiced in its ability to
respond to the petition by delay in its filing unless the petitioner
shows that it is based on grounds of which he could not have
had knowledge by the exercise ofreasonable diligence before
the circumstances prejudicial to the state occurred.
4. Id. at 483,489.
5. "Laches is such delay in enforcing one's rights as works disadvantage to
another" 30A C.J.S. Equity § 112, at 19. See also Moore v. Smith, 694 F.2d 115,
117 (6th Cir. 1982) ("Rather, Rule 9(a) codifies the equitable doctrine of laches
which has been applied in habeas cases to preclude a person from profiting to the
detriment of another by his own delay in enforcing his rights.").
6. Wise v. Annontrout, 952 F.2d 221, 223 (8th Cir. 1991).
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Rule 9(a) was enacted by Congress to discourage the filing of stale
claims. It permits the courts to quickly dismiss delayed petitions
without resorting to a full consideration of the merits of the claims.'
According to the Fifth Circuit, "it constitutes a legislative attempt to
balance conflicting public policies, the right of the petitioner not to
be unconstitutionally detained and the right ofthe State to dispute the

petitioner's claim.'

As originally proposed,' ° Rule 9(a) would have created a
rebuttable presumption of prejudice in favor of the State if the
petitioner filed his or her claim more than five years after the
judgment of conviction."
Ultimately, Congress rejected this
approach.' 2 In deleting the rebuttable presumption language, the
House Judiciary Committee reasoned it was unsound policy to require
the defendant to overcome a presumption of prejudice.' 3
7. Moore v. Smith, 694 F.2d 115, 116 (6th Cir. 1982).
8. McDonnell v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1982).
9. Moore, 694 F.2d at 116.
10. As originally proposed by the Supreme Court, Rule 9(a) included the
following language which the Congress deleted before the Rules became effective
on February 1, 1977:
If the petition is filed more than five years after the judgment of
conviction, there shall be a presumption, rebuttable by the
petitioner, that there is prejudice to the State. When a petition
challenges the validity of an action, such as revocation of
probation orparole, which occurs afterjudgmentofconviction, the
five year period as to that action shall start to run at the time the
.order in the challenged action took place.
Strahan v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 438,440 n.2 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing H.R. Rep. No.
1471,94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad. News 2478,
2481).
11. The Advisory Committee Note to the rule states:
This rule is intended to minimize abuse of the writ of habeas
corpus by limiting the right to assert stale claims... Subdivision
(a) provides that a petition attacking the judgment of a state court
may be dismissed on the grounds of delay if the petitioner knew or
should have known of the existence of the grounds he is presently
asserting in the petition and the delay has resulted in the State
being prejudiced in its ability to respond to the petition. If the
delay is more than five years after the judgment of conviction,
prejudice is presumed, although this presumption is rebuttable by
the petitioner. Otherwise, the State has the burden of showing
prejudice.
Bowen v. Murphy, 698 F.2d 381, 382 n.1 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing H.R. Rep. No.
1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin 1976 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News
2478,2481).
12. Strahan,750 F.2d at440-41.
13. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1471, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprintedin 1976
U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2478, 2481). "The committee noted that the 'facts
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As finally adopted, Rule 9(a) places the burden on the state to: (1)
make a particularized showing ofprejudice, (2) show that the prejudice
was caused by the petitioner having filed a late petition, and (3) show
that thepetitioner has not acted with reasonable diligence as a matter
of law.' The showing ofparticularized prejudice must be based on the
specific challenge raised in the petition; the mere passage oftime alone
is never sufficient to constitute prejudice. 5 Further, whether the State
will be able to re-convict the petitioner is irrelevant. 6 If the State
makes its showing of the three elements, the burden then shifts to the
petitioner to show either (1) the State actually is not prejudiced, or (2)
the petitioner's delay is based on grounds of which he could not have
had knowledge by the exercise of reasonable diligence before the
circumstances prejudicial to the State occurred.' 7
II. THE RIDEA U CASE

Rideau's original indictment arose out of a February 16, 1961
robbery of the Southgate Branch of the Gulf National Bank in Lake
Charles. During the robbery Julia Ferguson, a bank employee, was
killed.'8 A Calcasieu Parish jury found Rideau guilty and sentenced
him to death. On direct appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the
conviction and sentence were affirmed.' 9
The United States Supreme Court granted Rideau certiorari and
reversed his conviction and sentence.' Subsequently, venue was
changed to the Nineteenth Judicial District in East Baton Rouge Parish,
where the defendant was re-tried, found guilty, and sentenced to death.
The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence;
the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.2'
Next, Rideau applied to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Louisiana for habeas corpus relief, where the
which make it difficult for the State to respond to an old claim ...can readily be
discovered by the State."' Id. at 2482 n.8. "The proposed five-year rebuttable
presumption would have been in effect, a statute of limitation, arguably prohibited
by the Constitution which mandates that: 'The privilege ofthe writ ofhabeas corpus
shall not be suspended..."' U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
14. Walters v. Scott, 21 F.3d 683, 687 (5th Cir. 1994).
15. McDonnell v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 246, 251 (5th Cir. 1982).
16. Walters, 21 F.3d at 687 (citing Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 264-65,
106 S.Ct. 617 (1986); 17A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H.
Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure §42682 (2d ed. 1988) (first edition quoted
with approval in Strahan,750 F.2d at 441).
17. Id. (citingMcDonnell, 666 F.2d at 251 (quoting Rule 9(a)).
18. State v. Rideau, 278 So. 2d 100, 101 (La. 1973).
19. Id. (citing 137 So. 2d 238 (La. 1962)).
20. Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723, 83 S.Ct. 1417 (1963).
21.

Rideau v. Louisiana, 389 U.S. 861, 88 S.Ct. 113 (1967).
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defendant again was retried, convicted and sentenced to death.22
From that decision Rideau appealed to the Louisiana Supreme Court,
again arguing many bills of exception. Included was Bill of
Exceptions No. 2 which was reserved when the trial court overruled
both defense counsel's motion to quash the general venire list, grand
jury venire, and the indictment of the grand jury of Calcasieu Parish
and his motion to quash the general venire list and petit jury venire of
East Baton Rouge Parish.23 The court rejected all of Rideau's bills
as being without merit and affirmed his conviction.
Twenty-one years later, on July 27, 1994, Rideau filed a petition
for federal habeas corpus relief alleging that his indictment and
conviction were unlawfully obtained by an unconstitutionally
impaneled grand jury.24 The State moved for dismissal of Rideau's
petition as untimely under Rule 9(a) of the rules governing habeas
corpus procedure. A federal magistrate judge recommended the
district court deny the State's dismissal motion and grant Rideau's
petition for habeas corpus. 25 The warden, John Whitley, filed written
objections on October 17, 1997.26 Following an evidentiary hearing,
the federal district court denied Rideau's petition and granted the
State's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 9(a). 27 Rideau appealed.
The instant case is a result of that final appeal.
III. COURT OPINION 28
When a habeas claim is based on either an in-court proceeding or
one which was otherwise recorded, the State must demonstrate both
that the transcript is unavailable and the participants (judge, court
reporter, prosecutor, attorneys, law enforcement officials, and the
like) are unavailable or unable to remember critical events.2 9
Generally, the court will conduct a hearing to determine whether the
burden ofproof is met and will make findings regarding the existence
of prejudice.3 ° Rideau's habeas claim was based primarily on two
22. State v. Rideau, 278 So. 2d 100, 102.
23. Id.
24. Rideau, 237 F.3d at 476, 477.
25. Id. at 477.
26. Brief for Petitioner at 2, Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2000)
(No. 99-30849).
27. Rideau, 237 F.3d at 477.
28. As stated before, though the holding is indeed two-pronged, this casenote's
focus will be limited to Judge Dennis' holding on whether the district court
correctly dismissed Rideau's petition for a writ of habeas corpus as untimely under
Rule 9(a).
29. Rideau, 237 F.3d at 478.
30. Id.
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transcripts taken from pretrial evidentiary hearings held in the East
Baton Rouge state court on his motions to quash the Calcasieu Parish
grand jury bodies. 3 ' The transcript from the first hearing on
November 5, 1964, was introduced as evidence in the second hearing
on December 15, 1969. On appeal, both were made part of the
record.32
At each evidentiary hearing, Acton Hillebrandt, the clerk ofcourt
and ex-officio member of the jury commission, was the only
witness.33 Mr. Hillebrandt was elected Clerk of Court of Calcasieu
Parish in 1948 and served as an ex-officio member of its jury
commission until 1988. 34 At the first evidentiary hearing, Mr.
Hillebrandt testified that the commission selected its jury venire from
identification cards, which contained the names, race and other data
regarding prospective jurors from the parish of registrar voters and
other sources. The commission would select twenty people from
the general venire to form the grand jury venire. In Mr. Rideau's
case, only one of the twenty grand jurors was black. Mr. Hillebrandt
also testified that a person's race would neither qualify nor disqualify
him from serving on the grand jury. In addition, Mr. Hillebrandt
noted that when the actual grand jury venire was selected the jury
commissioners had no idea which case or defendant would come
before it. In Rideau's case, the grand jury that indicted him was
selected on January 5, 1961, one month and eleven days before
Rideau committed his crime.36
At the 1969 hearing, Mr. Hillebrandt gave a similar description of
the commission's procedures on selecting jurors. At this hearing,
Rideau introduced into evidence four identification cards, the 1960
census information, the voter registrar's affidavit, and the transcript
of the 1964 evidentiary hearing." After each hearing, the state trial
court overruled Rideau's motions to quash his conviction.38
Following a briefreview of the procedural history in Rideau's quest
to seek habeas corpus relief due to discriminatory grand jury
selection, the court examined each of the three elements the State
must show to prove prejudice.

31.

Id. at 479.

32. Id.
33. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2000)
(No. 99-30849).

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Obituaries, Lake Charles (Louisiana) Am. Press, May 5, 2000, at 2A.
Rideau, 237 F.3d at 479.
State v. Rideau, 278 So. 2d 100.
Rideau, 237 F.3d at 480.
Id.
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A. ParticularizedShowing ofPrejudice
The State alleged it was prejudiced in its ability to respond to the
petition because Mr. Hillebrandt, otherjury commission members and
the two state trial judges were either to elderly to recall details, at
unknown locations, or deceased. 9 In response, the court explained
the State may not simply allege prejudicial facts, but must offer
concrete proof of such allegations. ' For example, the State alleged
but did not present proof that Mr. Hillebrandt was physically or
mentally unable to testify. In addition, the State did not allege the
factual substance oftestimony Mr. Hillebrandt may have provided, or
even that it would differ from his testimony at the two state court
evidentiary hearings.'
The court next rejected the State's argument that it was prejudiced
by the disappearance of the race-coded identification cards and other
documentary exhibits. The State did not make any particularized
showing of prejudice from this disappearance.2 On the issue of
missing documentary evidence, the court concluded that Mr.
Hillebrandt's testimony from the prior evidentiary hearings, in which
he described the cards, was sufficient and had been preserved. As a
result, the court determined the availability of the actual cards was
unnecessary.43
B. PrejudiceCausedby the PetitionerHaving Fileda Late
Petition
Assuming the death, disability, or unavailability of each witness
was construed as particularized prejudice to the State, the State also
bore the burden of proving that Rideau's delay in filing his habeas
petition resulted in the loss of evidence." The court found the facts
alleged by the State did not specifically set forth when the prejudice
occurred. Though the parties stipulated that four of the jury
commissioners and one of the state court judges was deceased as of
39. Id. at 482.
40. Id. (citing Wise v. Armontrout, 952 F.2d at 223; Marks v. Estelle, 691 F.2d
732, 734 (5th Cir. 1982); Paprskar v. Estelle, 612 F.2d 1003, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980);
Jackson v. Estelle, 570 F.2d 546, 547 (5th Cir. 1978); Hamilton v. Watkins, 436
F.2d 1323, 1326 (5th Cir. 1970); and Hudson v. Alabama, 493 F.2d 171, 173 (5th
Cir. 1974)).
41. "[I]f the state wishes to establish prejudice from the death of the court
reporter and the unavailability of the court reporter's records, it must also establish
that the substance of those records is unavailable from other sources. This the state
has not done." Id. (quoting McDonnell, 666 F.2d at 253).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 483.
44. Id.
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January 1999, the State did not sufficiently allege or prove the dates
upon which each ofthe witnesses died or became unavailable. The
State also failed to prove when Rideau's delay became
unreasonable, or the substance of any witness's testimony lost
during the specific period of Rideau's allegedly unreasonable
delay." At a minimum, the court believed this would require the
State to establish that if Rideau filed his petition earlier, the
evidence the State claims to have lost, would still be available and
relevant.46
C. PetitionerHas Not Acted with ReasonableDiligence as a
MatterofLaw
Upon determination that the State had not met the first two
criteria, the court reached the final element of Rule 9(a) and
declared: "Because we hold that the State has failed to make a
sufficient showing of prejudice in its ability to respond to the
petition that was caused by the petitioner's delay, it is unnecessary
for us to determine whether Rideau's delay in filing his petition was
'
unreasonable." 47
IV. EXAMINING THE COURT'S RATIONALE
A. A ParticularizedShowing of Prejudice
The State of Louisiana failed to meet its burden of proving
particularized prejudice. Arguably, the State had sufficient
evidence at its disposal to meet the standard required by the court.
The lack of available witnesses and documentary evidence were
indeed valid assertions of prejudice. Dismissing the State's
arguments, the court reiterated that mere allegations of prejudice
would not suffice; rather, the State must offer concrete proof.48
Cases mentioned demonstrate a consistent refusal by the courts to
presume prejudice as a matter of law.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. The court relied upon the following cases to reach this conclusion: Walters

v. Scott, 21 F.3d 683, 686-87 (5th Cir. 1994); Strahan v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 438
441,443 (5th Cir. 1985); McDonnell v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 246, 251 (5th Cir. 1982);

Bouchillon v. Estelle, 628 F.2d 926, 929 (5th Cir. 1980); and Smith v. Duckworth,
910 F.2d 1492 (7th Cir. 1990).
48. Rideau, 237 F.3d at 482 (citing Wise v. Armontrout, 952 F.2d 221, 223
(8th Cir. 1991); Marks v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 730, 734 (5th Cir. 1982); Paprskar v.
Estelle, 612 F.2d 1003, 1008 (5th Cir. 1980); Jackson v. Estelle, 570 F.2d 546, 547
(5th Cir. 1978); Hamilton v. Watkins, 436 F.2d 1323, 1326 (5th Cir. 1970); and
Hudson v. Alabama, 493 F.2d 171, 173 (5th Cir. 1974)).
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For example, in Wise v. Armontrout,49 the court emphasized the
necessity of having a sufficient quantity of conclusive evidence on
which to base a decision to dismiss a Rule 9(a) petition. 50 The
district court found prejudice based on the State's inability to obtain
"pertinent documents" and the difficulty encountered in an attempt to
locate "reliable witnesses seventeen years after entrance ofthe guilty
plea." The allegations of prejudice, much like those made by the
State in Rideau, were brief, constrained, and evasive. The vague
assertions offered by the State never explained how it was actually
prejudiced. Thus, the court in Wise correctly found the lack of
specificity in the findings ofprejudice stood in sharp contrast to the
well-settled requirement of particularity.
In the case at hand, the State attempted to demonstrate prejudice
by offering proof that persons involved in the original indictment,
such as Jury Commission members and the former Clerk of Court,
were either too elderly to recall the specific details concerning the
ground raised by the petitioner, were deceased, or were unavailable.
These generalized grievances never demonstrated how these faded
memories and deaths actually harmed the State's ability to respond to
the petition. In addition, the State alleged that particular documentary
evidence had been depleted, most notably the jury identification cards
which no longer exist. Once again, there was no mention of the
manner in which this lack of evidence prejudiced the State.
1. Unavailabilityof Witnesses
At each hearing, Mr. Acton Hillebrandt, who is now deceased,52
was the only witness called by Mr. Rideau. There was no additional
testimony crucial to the issue ofjury selection from the other Jury
Commissioners.53 The State alleged Mr. Hillebrandt was too elderly
to recall specific details of the case at the time Rideau filed his
petition thus prejudicing the State. This, of course, was not the
State's strongest argument, as Mr. Hillebrandt could have been crossexamined at the earlier hearings. Nevertheless, the State neglected to
present concrete proof of Mr. Hillebrandt's physical inability to
testify, the substance ofhis potential testimony or whether it would
differ. 4 If a witness such as Mr. Hillebrandt was physically unable
to testify, proving as much would not be insurmountable. At a
49. 952 F.2d at 221.
50. Id. at 224.
51. Id. (quoting Magistrate's Rep. and Recomm. at 2).
52. Obituaries, Lake Charles (Louisiana) Am. Press, May 5, 2000, at 2A.
53. Brief for Respondent at 5, Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472 (No. 9930849).
54. Rideau, 237 F.3d at 482.
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minimum, the State could have submitted an affidavit of Mr.
Hillebrandt swearing under oath that he had no independent
recollection ofthe case."
In addition to proving the witness's inability to testify, the State
also needed to show what Mr. Hillebrandt would say that would differ
from the testimony ofthe prior hearings. For example, the testimony
from the two prior evidentiary hearings pertained only to how the
twenty person grand jury venire was selected. At no time during the
hearings did the petitioner elicit testimony from Mr. Hillebrandt
regarding how the twelve person grand jury, which ultimately
indicted Rideau, was selected. Thus, the petitioner took the testimony
ofMr. Hillebrandt regarding the selection ofthe grand jury venire and
applied it to the twelve person grand jury. The State could have
offered new testimony illustrating how the twenty person grand jury
venire was reduced to a twelve person grand jury. Or, the State could
have established that there existed race-neutral reasons for including
or excluding potential grand jurors, such as inappropriate age or past
felony convictions. 6 Lacking any type of concrete proof that Mr.
Hillebrandt's testimony would differ reduced the State's argument to
mere speculation that Mr. Hillebrandt might have materially assisted
the fact-finding process. 7
To support the finding of lack of particularized prejudice, the
court cited Walters v. Scott." In Walters, the court held the State's
allegations of prejudice were insufficient to support the district
court's summary dismissal of the petition under Rule 9(a) of the
Section 2254 Rules. The petitioner in Walters alleged he received
ineffective counsel because his lawyer, Parks, never perfected
Walter's appeal and never withdrew from the case.5 9 The State
argued it was prejudiced due to the inadequacy of Park's memory of
the facts surrounding the petitioner's plea and sentencing and his
inability to locate the case file. Park's affidavit, however, did not
unequivocally state that he had no recollection of any of the
circumstances surrounding Walter's case. Therefore, the court
determined the affidavit alone was insufficient to establish prejudice
to the State. In addition, the State alleged prejudice due to the death
of the court reporter and unavailability of the records.6" The court
55. See Brown v. Maggio, 730 F.2d 293, 295 (5th Cir. 1984) and Cotton v.
Mabry, 674 F.2d 701, 705 (8th Cir. 1982).
56. Brief for Petitioner at 3, Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472 (5th Cir. 2000)
(No. 99-30849).
57. See Bedford v. Att'y Gen. ofthe State of Ala., 934 F.2d 295,300 (11th Cir.
1991).
58. 21 F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 1994).

59. Id. at 687.
60. Id.
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again found such evidence insufficient and explained that in order to
establish prejudice from the death of a court reporter and
unavailability of records, it must also be established that the
substance of those records is unavailable from other sources.
Likewise, in Rideau, the State failed to prove Mr. Hillebrandt's
memory had deteriorated. An affidavit by Mr. Hillebrandt offering
sworn testimony of his failure to recollect material facts of the case
would have been sufficient under Walters. Furthermore, to prove the
State was prejudiced by the disappearance ofidentification cards, the
State should have established that particular information contained on
the cards was critical to the State's response to Rideau's petition.
Nevertheless, the State neglected to show evidence on the card was
no longer available from any other source.
The State also alleged it was prejudiced by the deaths of the jury
commissioners and other participants involved in the case. Because
these witnesses had died, the State contended it was prejudiced by the
inability to cross-examine key witnesses. Perhaps the State believed
such allegations were self-proving; dead witnesses cannot testify,
which in turn prejudiced the State's ability to elicit material
testimony. The State, however, may not end its argument here. Proof
of why a witness's death will disadvantage the respondent is
mandatory.6
2. UnavailabilityofDocumentary Evidence
In addition to the unavailability of key witnesses, the State
contended the missing documentary evidence was crucial to defend
the habeas petition.6 The identification cards were no longer in
existence, and other records dealing with the motion to quash hearing
were no longer available.63 Again, the prejudice flowing from the
loss of evidence may not be presumed. It was not enough for the
State to surmise what information might have been offered in the
documentary evidence. Further, the entire transcript ofthe state court
hearings and evidentiary hearings, including testimony which
described the voter registration cards, had been preserved.' Thus, the
61. See Bedford v. Att'y Gen. ofthe State ofAla., 934 F.2d 295,300 (1 th Cir.
1991); Lawrence v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11 th Cir. 1988); McDonnell v.
Estelle, 666 F.2d 246, 253 (5th Cir. 1982); United States ex rel. Barksdale v.
Blackburn, 610 F.2d 253, 260-01 (5th Cir. 1980).
62. Brief for Respondent at 13, Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472 (No. 9930849).
63. United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana, Chief
Judge Frank Polozola (proceedings No. 94-CV-952, page 151).
64. See Smith, 910 F.2d at 1495 (7th Cir. 1990) (There was no merit to the
State's Rule 9(a) claim of prejudice when the "state had the opportunity during

168
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State was required to establish that the substance of the registration
cards was unavailable from any other source which the State could
obtain the requisite information to counter Rideau's claim. 65 The loss
of evidence must detrimentally impair the State's ability to respond
to the particular allegations or theories asserted by the petitioner as
grounds for habeas corpus.66
B. PrejudiceCausedby the PetitionerHavingFileda Late
Petition
The second component of the State's burden of proof may be
classified as the causation element. The State must demonstrate the
prejudice caused resulted from the petitioner's delay in bringing the
writ. 6 7
In Rideau, the State was required to show that the
unavailability of witnesses and documentary evidence was a direct
result of Rideau's twenty-one year delay in filing his petition. At a
minimum, this required the State to confirm that if Rideau had filed
his petition at some earlier time, the witnesses and the documentary
evidence would have been available.68
One case cited by the Rideau court was Marks v. Estelle.6 9 The
court in Marks, which found evidence of prejudice to the State to be
"manifest," ultimately concluded that whether the State was
prejudiced was not at issue; rather, the crucial question was when the
prejudice occurred.70 In Marks, there was uncertainty surrounding the
date of conviction, from which the petitioner's delay would be
measured. Because the State based its prejudice argument upon the
incorrect date of conviction, the court concluded the State never
pinpointed any instance of prejudice. According to the Marks court,
"the state, which normally has far greater access to the facts, already
must shoulder the burden of demonstrating that it has suffered actual
prejudice from the petitioner's delay. When pertinent, the state
should also be required to show when that prejudice occurred." 71 The
State in Rideau could have met this burden of proof by submitting
death certificates, evidence ofroutine record disposal procedures, or

those hearings to present the evidence that it deemed relevant to the determination
[of petitioner's claim]" and the testimony of key witnesses "has been preserved in

its entirety.").
65.

Walters, 21 F.3d at 688.

66.

Mayola v. Alabama, 623 F.2d 992, 1000 (5th Cir. 1980).

67. See Lawrence v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1988).
68. See Walters, 21 F.3d at 688.
69. 691 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1982).

70. Id. at 733.
71. Id. at 734.
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any other evidence pertinent to the alleged prejudice.72 Conceivably,
such information was readily available to the State. Thus, it is
possible the State simply did not realize that it was required to be
submitted as evidence.
An example of the importance of proving the causation element
is found in Hill v. Linahan.73 The petitioner, who pled guilty to
murder, filed a habeas petition alleging ineffective counsel, his guilty
plea was involuntary, his attorney was not a member of the Georgia
bar and there was no written record of his guilty plea.74 The
respondent claimed that the petitioner's delay prejudiced him because
the transcript ofthe petitioner's plea was unavailable and counsel was
deceased.75 The court found no indication in the record that a
transcript would have been available had the petitioner filed his writ
at an earlier date. 76 There was only an insufficient assertion by the
respondent claiming the guilty plea transcript was not available from
the courthouse." In reference to the respondent's unavailability of
counsel claim, the court conceded that ifthe petitioner's counsel was
deceased, the respondent would have been prejudiced in his ability to
respond to the allegations because his attorney was the only person
who could testify to the actions taken to represent the petitioner.78
However, the respondent failed to disclose the date of counsel's
death. Due to this omission, the respondent failed to prove that
counsel would have been available if the petitioner had filed his claim
earlier.79
The court's reasoning in Hill mirrors the court's analysis in
Rideau. Assuming pertinent documentary evidence was missing, the
burden remained on the State to prove it would have been available
at a specific earlier date and had Rideau filed his petition timely, the
State would not have been prejudiced. Again, assuming the deaths of
thejury commissioners prejudiced the State's ability to respond to the
petition-either because they could have provided new information
or contradicted Mr. Hillebrandt's testimony-the date of each death
should have been offered into evidence. Even if the other jury
commissioners could have provided significant testimony, they could
have died shortly after Rideau's conviction and sentence. Thus, the
loss ofsuch testimony would not have been caused by Rideau' s delay.

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

See Lawrence, 837 F.2d at 1575.
697 F.2d 1032 (11th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1033.
Id. at 1035.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1035-36.
Id
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Therefore, under the rationale of cases ° which discuss the second
element, the procedure utilized to prove Rule 9(a) causation is
essential. Once the respondent proves a particular fact is prejudicial,
the date of when that prejudicial event occurred must be submitted
into evidence. Next, the respondent must determine what constituted
a reasonable amount of time in which the petitioner could have
responded. Finally, it must be shown that the prejudicial event fell
after the "reasonable time to respond" period ended.
C. PetitionerHas Not Acted with ReasonableDiligenceas a
MatterofLaw
The court completely evaded the last element of the State's
burden ofproof This was perhaps the only component of the burden
ofproof for which the State presented sufficient evidence. The State
established Mr. Rideau had been incarcerated for over forty years and
was certainly no stranger to the courthouse or to what happens in
criminal proceedings."s Rideau delayed filing his petition, perhaps
inexcusably, especially in light of the fact that 33 years had elapsed
since he had actual knowledge of the existence of the ground upon
which his petition was based."
The reasonable diligence element, or the "unless" clause of Rule
9(a) is consistent with its equitable nature. Delay is excused only if
the petition is based on a change in the law or newly discovered
evidence. In such a case, the State may not rely upon the prejudice
suffered during the period of reasonable delay." In the Rideau case
there was no newly discovered evidence offered by Rideau, and the
laws on which he based his claims had not changed. In fact, as Judge
Dennis pointed out, there was jurisprudence on the matter (upon
which the petition is based) dating back to 1880. 4 Yet, Rideau
advanced no substantial explanation for his prolonged delay.
Rule 9(a) codifies the equitable doctrine of laches as it is applied
in habeas cases, which precludes a person from profiting to the
80. See Lawrence v. Jones, 837 F.2d 1572 (11th Cir. 1988); Hill v. Linahan,
697 F.2d 1032 (11th Cir. 1983); McDonnell v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 246 (5th Cir.
1982); Marks v. Estelle, 691 F.2d 730 (5th Cir. 1982); and Walters v. Collins, 21
F.3d 683 (5th Cir. 1994).
81. See Henson v. Estelle, 641 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir. 1981).
82. Brief for Respondent at 11, Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472 (No. 9930849).
83. Marks, 691 F.2d at 732.
84. Rideau,237 F.3d at 484 (citing Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 556,99 S.
Ct. 2993 (1979); Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S. 625,628, 92 S. Ct. 1221 (1972);
Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 107 U.S. 110, 119, 1 S. Ct. 625 (1883); Neal v.
Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1880); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 492-95
& n.12, 97 S. Ct. 1272 (1977)).
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detriment of another by his own delay in enforcing his rights. In the
instant case, for Rideau to have waited 29 years to re-file his petition
was inexcusable and should not be condoned by the courts. The
State argued, "this is a tactic used by petitioner[s] to wait out their
time until many years later when witnesses are dead or their
whereabouts unknown. Patience may be a virtue, but it should not be
a tool used by an admitted murderer for habeas relief."86
Whether the Fifth Circuit would have agreed with the State on the
final element is immaterial. The final holding of the court would
have been no different had the court concluded Rideau unreasonably
delayed re-filing his petition. The State's proof of failure to act with
reasonable diligence under the law alone will not merit dismissal of
a petitioner's habeas claim absent a showing of particularized
prejudice by the State.
Today, many of the "unreasonable delay" problems faced by the
courts87 have been eliminated by the passage of the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 19968 (AEDPA). Enacted and
effective on April 24, 1996, the AEDPA drastically changed the legal
landscape of federal habeas corpus law. One significant feature of
this statute89 is the addition of a one-year limitation period for the
85. Moore v. Smith, 694 F.2d 115, 117 (6th Cir. 1982).
86. Brief for Respondent at 13, Rideau v. Whitley, 237 F.3d 472 (No. 9930849).
87. See Strahan v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 438,443-44 (5th Cir. 1985); Terry v.
Enomoto, 723 F.2d 697,700 (9th Cir. 1984); Bowen v. Murphy, 698 F.2d 381,382
(10th Cir. 1983); Cotton v. Mabry, 674 F.2d 701, 704 (8th Cir. 1982); Baxter v.
Estelle, 614 F.2d 1030, 1035-35 (5th Cir. 1980); Honeycutt v. Ward, 612 F.2d 36,
41-42 (2nd Cir. 1979).
88. Because Rideau's petition was filed before the effective date of the
AEDPA, its provisions amending the habeas corpus statute do not apply to Rideau's
case. See Rideau, 237 F.3d at 476, n.2.
89. Section 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) of the AEDPA provides in pertinent part:
(d)(1) A one year time period of limitation shall apply to an
application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment a State court. The limitation period shall
run from the latest of:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws
ofthe United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented
from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review;
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
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filing of habeas corpus petitions by state and federal prisoners. 90
With this provision, Congress imposed a one-year statute of
limitations on state and federal prisoners seeking habeas corpus relief.
Arguably, "the purpose of the statutory reform was to curb the
lengthy delays in filing that were occurring in federal habeas
litigation, while preserving the availability of habeas review when a
prisoner diligently pursues state remedies and applies for federal
habeas relief in a timely manner."'
Thus, petitioners who
industriously pursue their claims, or who have extraordinary
circumstances (such as a change in law or existence ofnew evidence),
would be entitled to petition the courts. Petitioners who exhibit no
reasonable diligence as a matter of law would not be granted such a
writ. Arguably, the interest ofboth the petitioner and the government
is best served if claims are raised while evidence is still fresh. 92
Statutes such as the AEDPA facilitate the reduction of untimely
petitions.
CONCLUSION

The writ of habeas corpus has existed in American law since the
inception of this country. Typically a remedy of last resort, the
federal writ usually is embraced by prisoners who have exhausted all
other forms of relief. Thus, delay is inherent in the nature of the
remedy. The tri-factor burden of proof on the State preserves the
equitable purpose of the rule; timely filed meritorious claims are
welcomed, inexcusably delayed petitions which prejudice the State
are not.
The court in Rideau correctly decided that the State of Louisiana
did not meet its burden of proof. Though allegations of prejudice
were made, such as the unavailability of witnesses and documentary
evidence, the respondent failed to show how it was prejudiced. Thus,
the State did not meet the first requirement of particularized
prejudice. Next, the State never linked the prejudice to the delay of
the petitioner. No evidence was offered to show that the missing
evidence would have been available had the petitioner filed his
petition in a timely manner. Without this connection the State was
not able to prove the causation element. The court opined the last
presented could have been discovered through the exercise of
due diligence.
90. Douglas J. Glaid, The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996: A New One Year LimitationForFilinga FederalHabeas CorpusPetition,

75 Aug. Fla. B.J. 55, (2001).
91.

Id.

92. Rules Governing Section 2254 cases, Rule 9(a), 28 U.S.C. § Section 2254,
advisory committee notes (1976).
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element required no discussion. If there was no prejudice that could
be linked to the petitioner, then there was no need to discuss how
long he waited to file his claim. It is well established that delay alone
is not sufficient to constitute prejudice. A court may not predicate its
decision on the passage oftime, as inexcusable as it may be, for such
reliance would thwart the chief objective of Rule 9(a).
Whether the instant case exemplifies the situation which 9(a)
seeks to avoid is unclear. In Rideau, the State fell short of meeting
the first two elements of its burden of proof. Perhaps the State did
not have any evidence sufficient to prove particularized prejudice. Or
maybe the State trusted the allegations were self-proving, unaware of
what standard the court required. The standard articulated by Judge
Dennis is not unworkable. With specific factual support for
allegations ofprejudice based on the petitioner's unreasonable delay,
a respondent actually prejudiced in its ability to respond to the
petition is entitled to take advantage of dismissal pursuant to Rule

9(a).
Vanessa L. Waguespack*

* The author wishes to thank Professor Joseph T. Bockrath, R. Gordon Kean
Professor of Law, Louisiana State University Paul M. Hebert Law Center, for his
invaluable research assistance in preparing this article. The author is also grateful
to Carl J. Serrat, III for his insightful comments on this article and for his constant
encouragement and support throughout her law school career.

